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Are Cost-Plus Defense Contracts
(Justifiably) Out of Favor?
Chong Wang and Joseph G. San Miguel
ABSTRACT: A common tenet is that the use of cost-plus contracts contributes to cost
overruns in the context of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Accordingly,
policy-makers express a preference for fixed-price contracts as opposed to cost-plus
contracts. While fixed-price contracts may be superior in certain scenarios, such
scenarios are limited in the MDAP context. We document three potential unintended
negative consequences of fixed-price contracts. We argue that the notion that fixed-price
contracts are better than cost-plus contracts for limiting cost overruns is misleading.
Keywords: DoD contracts; fixed-price contracts; cost-plus contracts; information
asymmetry; agency problem; budget-based cost-plus scheme.
JEL Classifications: G38; H57; M48.
INTRODUCTION
Federal government spending on contracts more than doubled in the eight years of President
George W. Bush’s administration. In 2008, U.S. taxpayers paid more than $500 billion to
contractors, and the Department of Defense (DoD), the largest contracting agency, spent $315
billion on contracts. As DoD contracting outlays grew, critics called for fixing the defense
procurement system that was alleged to be wasteful and lacking proper oversight. A recent study
(Government Accountability Office [GAO] 2009) found that in 2008, approximately 70 percent of 96
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)1 were experiencing significant cost overruns,
reaching over $295 billion (a 26 percent overrun) over the life of the projects.
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1 The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USDAT&L) defines MDAPs as
programs with more than $509 million (fiscal year 2010 dollars) in research development, test, and evaluation
expenditures; or at least $3.054 billion (fiscal year 2010 dollars) in procurement funding; or as designated as a
major defense acquisition program by the milestone decision authority. (Section 2430 of title 10, United States
Code, ‘‘Major Defense Acquisition Program Defined.’’)
Shortly after taking office, President Barack Obama (2009) issued the ‘‘Memorandum on
Government Contracting,’’ urging federal contracting agencies to improve the effectiveness of their
acquisition practices and contracting performance. The presidential memorandum explicitly stated
that ‘‘there shall be a preference for fixed-price type contracts’’ (Obama 2009; emphasis added).
Ashton Carter, the Pentagon’s top weapons buyer, in a September 14, 2010, interview with
Bloomberg, echoed support for ‘‘increasing the use of fixed-price contracts’’ (Carter 2010). The
latest and most significant legislative response to the acquisition system reform was the passage
of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA), which was unanimously supported by
Congress and signed into law by President Obama on May 22, 2009. One primary initiative of
WSARA is to encourage competition to reduce sole-source contracting (often cost-plus-based)
and pave the way for greater use of fixed-price contracts.
When expressing their preference for the fixed-price contracts, the president, the Congress,
and DoD officials implicitly blame the increasing use of cost-plus contracts as a key contributing
factor to large and frequent cost overruns.2 President Obama (2009) stated that ‘‘The days of
giving defense contractors a blank check are over,’’ and pledged that his reforms would end
unnecessary no-bid, cost-plus contracts. The notion that the fixed-price contract is better than the
cost-plus contract is shared by some academics, as well (Berrios 2006).
Our concern about the ongoing policy push toward fixed-price contracts motivates this study.
The key research question relates to the type of contract in the MDAP settings. Specifically, does
dissatisfaction with cost-plus contracts in the context of MDAP necessarily justify switching to
fixed-price arrangements?
We caution policy-makers on three unintended negative consequences that potentially result
from the use of fixed-price contracts for MDAPs. First, risk-sharing is vital to motivate private
contractors to engage in complex defense projects. Fixed-price contracts provide no or little
risk-sharing.3 Thus, the first unintended consequence of promoting the use of fixed-price contracts
in the MDAP context is the ‘‘no-deal’’ scenario, in which important projects are forgone because the
risk is too high to be borne by the contractors.4
Second, despite a preconceived notion that fixed-price contracts save taxpayers’ dollars
relative to cost-plus contracts for the ‘‘deal’’ cases, we nevertheless argue that this view is incorrect
in the MDAP context. To the contrary, a fixed-price contract in a typical major weapon acquisition
likely leads to a higher, not lower, payment from the government than under a cost-plus contract.
This is because in negotiating a fixed-price contract with less-informed government, contractors
demand ‘‘risk premium’’ for bearing risk. Moreover, contractors can extract ‘‘information rents’’ to
exploit their information advantage.
2 ‘‘Since 2001 . . . there has been a significant increase in the dollars awarded without full and open competition
and an increase in the dollars obligated through cost-reimbursement contracts. Between fiscal years 2000 and
2008, for example, dollars obligated under cost-reimbursement contracts nearly doubled, from $71 billion in
2000 to $135 billion in 2008’’ (Obama 2009).
3 Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) provides no risk-sharing unless a renegotiation is allowed. Fixed-price contracts with
economic price adjustments and Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fee (FPIF) contracts provide limited risk-sharing.
4 This ‘‘no-deal’’ situation could be one of the following two cases: (1) The risk is so high that no one is willing to
submit a bid, or everybody solicited for bidding declines to participate, or (2) somebody does submit a bid, yet
the government cannot agree with the price.
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Third, policy-makers are calling for a more competitive industry structure to pave the way for
fixed-price contracts. We argue that, although well intended, the implementation of this policy
could promote an inefficient industry structure.5
Aiming for better defense acquisition practices, we make two recommendations to policy-
makers. First, for MDAP contracting, a general cost-plus framework is preferred to a fixed-price
one in order to keep risk-sharing benefits. Second, realizing that cost-plus contracts are not
immune to information asymmetry and agency problems that fundamentally contribute to cost
overrun problems, we recommend a ‘‘Budget-Based Cost-Plus Scheme’’ for MDAP contracting
practice. We demonstrate that under this structure, the contracting firm voluntarily and truthfully
reveals its unbiased cost estimates. This reduces information asymmetry and abuse of the system
due to the conflict of interest between the contractor and the government, which ultimately reduces
the cost inefficiency.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we point out that the current U.S. policy focus on
the change of contract form is misplaced. Second, within the cost-plus contracts framework, we
make implementable, efficient contract design recommendations. While the theory of ‘‘truth-telling’’
exists in the literature, few prior studies provide practical strategies. Finally, our research
generates implications for the optimal defense industry structure. Specifically, we are concerned
about the policy push toward a less-consolidated defense industry by those who advocate
fixed-price contracts.6 In contrast with conventional economic wisdom, which usually prefers
competition to oligopoly or monopoly, we argue that the current concentrated defense industry
structure is likely the result of economic Darwinism and, hence, may be the best possible outcome.
Consequently, efforts to reverse the consolidation trend and deviate from the status quo are likely
to be counterproductive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section begins with a general
review of procurement and contracting literature, and then discusses the uniqueness of the
specific MDAP contracting environment. Based on the second section, the unintended negative
consequences of advocating the use of fixed-price contracts are elaborated in the third section.
The fourth section presents our policy recommendations for designing optimal defense contracts.
Concluding remarks are in the fifth section.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE UNIQUE CONTRACTING
ENVIRONMENT OF MDAP
Literature Review
Procurement is typically characterized as the scenario in which the government is the only
buyer. This is particularly true in defense procurement as, almost without exception, the
government purchases items for defense through contracts. The literature regarding incentive
contracts in a procurement setting presumes both adverse selection (i.e., information asymmetry
5 To keep the introduction part of this paper concise, we refer readers to the third section, ‘‘Unintended
Consequences of Advocating Increased Use of Fixed-Price Contracts in the MDAP Context,’’ for detailed
arguments regarding the three unintended negative consequences of employing fixed-price contracts in the
MDAP context.
6 Such a policy push toward more competitive and less concentrated industry structure is motived by the desire
to create a more suitable industry structure for the use of fixed-price contracts. A premise here is that fixed-
price contracts work better when a market-based price is readily available through competition.
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between the seller, the defense contractor, and the buyer, the government) and moral hazard (i.e.,
hidden action, the fact that the defense contractor’s cost-saving effort is not observable to the
government). These problems are addressed by designing contracts that include contract-type
choice, contract-scheme design, and contract pricing. The following structure is typically assumed:
(1) A benevolent dictator, that is, the government, seeks to maximize social welfare; (2) The
government is risk-neutral, while the contractor is usually risk-averse;7 (3) The government (the
principal) designs the contract; (4) The defense contractor can refuse to participate; that is, the
firm’s reservation utility level has to be achieved or exceeded; (5) Some incurred costs are
verifiable with the existence of auditors, but the minimum achievable cost is not observable, or at
least not verifiable; and (6) Although the government can face either a competitive or a sole-source
environment, the latter is more common in DoD practice.
Loosely put, the government’s ‘‘benevolent’’ role translates to two objectives: encourage cost
reduction and limit the contracting firm’s rent. Moral hazard gives rise to the contractor’s reluctance
to exert effort to minimize cost, and adverse selection (information asymmetry) leads to
information rents to the contractors. When little information asymmetry is present, the optimal
contract is Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP), so the contractor has an incentive to reduce cost. On the other
hand, Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) should be employed if extreme information asymmetry
prevails. More specifically, when a mixture of moral hazard and adverse selection exists, various
forms of incentive contracts that lie between FFP and CPFF achieve the best balance.
Loeb and Surysekar (1994) state that ‘‘the relative severity of the moral hazard and adverse
selection issue leads to the relative domination of the fixed-price contract and the cost-plus
contract and that the optimal linear procurement contract approaches a fixed-price (cost-plus)
contract as the adverse selection problem decreases (increases) relative to the moral hazard
problem.’’ In the context of MDAP, the adverse selection problem (i.e., information asymmetry) is a
far more serious concern than moral hazard, as most contracts in place today include incentive
provisions that motivate contractors to contain cost. The combination of the prediction from Loeb
and Surysekar (1994) and the insight that adverse selection dominates moral hazard in the MDAP
scenario naturally leads to the policy implication that cost-plus contracts should be favored over
fixed-price contracts.
One legitimate concern over the preference toward cost-plus contracts is that while fixed-price
contracts have drawbacks relative to cost-plus contracts, they do have one potential advantage.
That is, there is no incentive to engage in opportunistic ‘‘overhead-cost-shifting’’ behavior under
fixed-price contracts. Such a cost-shifting behavior can exist among the defense contractors who
are largely reimbursed under the cost-plus scheme.
According to the cost-shifting hypothesis (Rogerson 1992; Thomas and Tung 1992), a typical
defense contractor has two types of revenues: the first stream of revenue derives from DoD
products whose prices are cost-based and, hence, are cost-sensitive; the other source of revenue
is from typical commercial products whose prices are competition-based and, therefore, are cost-
insensitive. Rogerson (1992) argues that a firm with the combination of defense products and
commercial products shifts common overhead costs from cost-insensitive segments to cost-
sensitive segments. Since government contracts are typically reimbursed based upon costs, and
the price is determined based on negotiation between the two parties and often subject to
renegotiation, this cost-shifting strategy results in higher contractor profitability at the expense of
taxpayers.
7 One can also assume that the contractor is risk-neutral.
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Early evidence is consistent with the cost-shifting hypothesis. For instance, Thomas and Tung
(1992) find that pension plans are overfunded when employees work on government contracts, but
excess pension assets are withdrawn when employees work on non-DoD products. Rogerson
(1992) not only documents the excess profitability of defense contractors, but also finds that the
defense product segments are significantly less capital-intensive than less government-oriented
segments. This is consistent with the cost-shifting hypothesis that predicts an input substitution
effect (between capital and direct labor). That is, the defense sector uses excessive direct labor,
since the overhead allocation is frequently based upon direct labor-based measures.
A more recent study, however, casts doubt on the validity of the cost-shifting hypothesis.
McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) confirm that defense contractors enjoyed excess profit on their
government work, yet find no evidence of common overhead cost-shifting. Specifically, they
compare return on assets (ROA) among three types of segments within defense contracting firms:
(1) commercial segments, (2) government segments, and (3) mixed segments. The main testable
hypothesis is as follows: if the cost-shifting theory leads to the excess profitability of defense
contractors, then one expects the highest profit in the mixed segment, where managers have the
most opportunities to shift common overhead costs. In contrast with this expectation, McGowan
and Vendrzyk (2002) either find that the government segments (not the mixed segments)
significantly outperform the other two types or find no significant difference across the three
categories, depending on the time period. Such evidence suggests that unusually high profitability
for government segments is more likely due to nonaccounting explanations than to strategic cost
allocation.
Therefore, despite the theoretical appeal of the cost-shifting hypothesis, the empirical support
is, at best, mixed. A possible explanation is that in practice, defense acquisition, especially MDAP,
is heavily regulated and highly scrutinized.8
Hence, while not all ‘‘opportunistic cost-shifting’’ in cost-plus contracts is challenged, detected,
and penalized, we speculate that regulatory scrutiny effectively mitigates the cost-shifting problem.
As a result, the advantage of fixed-price contracts over cost-plus ones is limited in this regard.
To recap, the primary inference from the aforementioned literature review is that cost-plus
contracts dominate fixed-price contracts, because the main concern is adverse selection (i.e.,
information asymmetry) rather than moral hazard. The unique features of MDAPs, as elaborated in
the following subsection, support this insight.
The Unique Contracting Environment of MDAP
The DoD is both the biggest and the most unique federal contracting agency. At the center of
its activities are big-ticket purchases called Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).
According to the Government Accountability Office (2010a), MDAPs are designated to ‘‘acquire,
8 For example, defense contractors must comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (2005), which
now is a more-than-two-thousand-page document that sets policy for virtually every aspect of federal
contracting. Moreover, the vast majority of defense contractors (with a few exceptions) must follow Cost
Accounting Standards (CAS) promulgated by the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB). The Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audits and ensures contractors’ compliance with the FAR and CAS. CAS has
explicit guidelines for allocating indirect costs. Audits performed by the DCAA assesses whether indirect costs
are ‘‘reasonable, allowable, and allocable to the contracts, in accordance with CAS, and not prohibited by the
contract, Government statute, or regulation’’ (FAR 2005, part 31). Intentional manipulation of a federal
contract’s costs results in criminal penalties. Finally, the financial rewards, as well as the protections, given to
whistleblowers further make the cost of ‘‘opportunistic cost allocation’’ even higher.
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modernize, or extend the service life of major military equipment such as aircrafts, ships, tanks,
and self-propelled weapons.’’ From 2003 to 2010, the DOD’s portfolio ‘‘increased from 77 to 98
MDAPs and the overall investment in these programs grew from approximately $1.2 trillion to $1.7
trillion.’’
In contrast with a typical commercial contracting scenario, in which bidders compete to make
an objective market price readily available, the MDAP contracting environment is characterized by
the following features:
(1) MDAPs normally involve substantial business risk. Such risk stems from difficulty and
uncertainty in major weapon systems’ design, development, and production. Other
contributing factors are changing DoD requirements and integrating between the
development and manufacturing, as well as between the prime contractor and the
subcontractors. Additional risks arise from the compliance costs associated with federal
acquisition policies and the scrutiny from federal agencies. The cost burden for complying
with the government’s unique infrastructure and disclosures of costs, pricing data, and
other sensitive business information further elevate the contractors’ risk.
(2) The DoD is typically the sole purchaser of major weapon systems. This feature has two
implications. First, defense contractors’ technological investments and capital expendi-
tures, often very large due to the complexity of the tasks, produce only non-transferable
assets and, hence, add even more risk. Second, economies of scale, usually achieved
through a large base of demand, are unlikely. In the last two decades, the consolidation of
the defense industry9 is an indication of the contracting firms’ struggles to achieve greater
economy of scale10 through the supply side.
(3) The complexity, uncertainty, and long-term commitment in major weapon systems often
result in a ‘‘sole-source contractor’’ situation, in which only one or a few contractors are
capable of undertaking the contract. Other contributing factors to the sole-source or near
sole-source situation include the DoD’s need for secrecy, expediency, and/or safeguard-
ing human resources. We emphasize that the DoD’s unique sole-source contracting
environment is unlikely to change soon. MDAP spending on single-source contracts in
recent years has increased considerably, from 76 percent in 2004 to 87 percent in 2008
(Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] 2010). The economic downturn
since 2008, coupled with ongoing DoD cost-saving initiatives (fueled by the pressure of
reducing the federal budget deficit) will likely induce a new wave of mergers and
acquisitions and, in turn, reduce competition. Hence, the industry consolidation trend
witnessed during the past two decades (e.g., Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas,
Lockheed acquired Martin Marietta, and Northrop acquired Grumman) will likely continue,
despite the WSARA effort to promote competition.
To summarize, the MDAP contracting environment is unique in the sense that an MDAP
contract is typically a sole-buyer-and-sole-seller case, in which market competitive forces rarely
exist and significant information asymmetry and potential agency problems prevail. On the
contractor side, the business risk is too high to be borne by contractors themselves. On the
government side, the major concern is the potential abuse of the system that results from
information asymmetry.
9 Throughout the 1990s, hundreds of defense contractors disappeared in a massive consolidation. Federal and
civilian defense employment fell by about 2.5 million jobs (Thomson 1998).
10 Hensel (2010) finds that greater efficiencies followed defense industry consolidation.
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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ADVOCATING INCREASED
USE OF FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS IN THE MDAP CONTEXT
Unintended Consequence No. 1: Fixed-Price Contracts Provide Few Risk-Sharing Benefits
The pros and cons of cost-plus versus fixed-price contracts are extensively investigated in the
extant literature (Chapman and Ward 1994a, 1994b; Loeb and Surysekar 1994). In general, fixed-
price contracts are optimal where little uncertainty exists in technological requirements and
developments. The scenario that best justifies the use of fixed-price contracts is the procurement
of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) assets, in which a competitive market price is readily available
and the technological characteristics are well specified. To the point, the FAR explicitly requires
Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts or fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment11 for the
acquisition of commercial items. Moreover, a contracting firm working under a fixed-price contract
bears all or the majority of the risks and has an incentive to save cost, since cost savings increase
profit and cost overruns reduce profit.
While a fixed price works well in a COTS scenario, fixed prices are not an optimal contracting
form when significant uncertainty exists about technological requirements. As examples, the Army
Future Combat System (FCS) (U.S. Department of Defense 2009) illustrates a system of complex
electronic weapon systems that proved too difficult to design and implement within pre-specified
budgets. Similarly, the Navy’s modular Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) (GAO 2010b) is in an ongoing
struggle to merge functionality and technology, yet remains within cost estimates.
In the examples above, cost-plus contracts can provide risk-sharing benefits for the
contractors, which are absent from fixed-price contracts. Absent risk-sharing from the government,
important, yet risky, major weapon projects are forgone and, as a consequence, social welfare is
suboptimal.
Unintended Consequence No. 2: Fixed-Price Contracts Lead to Higher Government
Payments
In the case of MDAPs, in which the project risk is inherently high, coupled with very few
competitors and significant information asymmetry, a sole-source contractor who is forced to
accept a fixed-price contract has two incentives. First, a risk-averse contractor demands a risk
premium to compensate for risk level. Hence, even in the absence of opportunistic behavior, the
contractor submits a higher-than-expected cost to the government as a basis for fixed-price
determination. We argue that this behavior costs taxpayers unnecessarily and incurs a deadweight
welfare loss. The reason is that while the individual contractors tend to be risk-averse, the federal
government contracts with many contractors and, hence, can diversify across a portfolio of MDAP
providers. That is, it is more efficient for the government, rather than the contractor, to bear the
risk.
11 A fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment provides for upward and downward revision of the stated
contract price upon the occurrence of specified contingencies. This type of contract is used when there is
serious doubt concerning the stability of market or labor conditions that are beyond the contractor’s control.
Although a fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment provides a certain level of risk-sharing, such
risk-sharing is quite limited in the sense that those adjustments are restricted to industry-wide shocks only. The
contractor’s individual cost performance does not form a basis for price adjustment.
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Second, due to information asymmetry, the contractor has both motive and ability to artificially
inflate the cost estimate to command additional ‘‘information rents.’’ The demand for risk premium
and the desire to extract information rents means that there is no guarantee that taxpayers are
better off in a fixed-price contract than a cost-plus contract. We expect that, in general, a fixed-
price contract in the absence of a market-established price and information symmetry leads to
higher cost to the government than under a cost-plus contract. Note that a critical assumption of
our argument is that the government does not possess the necessary information to form accurate
cost estimates ex ante and, therefore, relies on the contractor, often sole-source, to provide a cost
estimate as the basis for determining the fixed-price.
Unintended Consequence No. 3: Unjustified Favor toward Fixed-Price Contracts Promotes
Inefficient Industry Structure
A widely held view is that fixed-price contracts cannot be justified without competition among
potential contractors. Driven by this belief, and fixated with the mindset that fixed-price contracts
should be preferred to cost-plus contracts, policy-makers promote a more competitive defense
industry structure. The intent is good: a market price established by the competitive forces needs
to be present for fixed-price contracts to work. For instance, the Weapon Systems Acquisition
Reform Act (2009), in Section 202, requires the Secretary of Defense to take measures to ensure
competition at both the prime contract level and the subcontract level throughout the lifecycle of a
program ‘‘as a means to improve contractor performance.’’ As examples, (1) competitive
prototyping (at system or subsystem level) is required prior to moving to the engineering and
manufacturing development phase (i.e., Milestone B), (2) dual-sourcing, (3) unbundling of
contracts, (4) using modular, open architectures to enable competition for upgrades, and (5)
licensing additional suppliers. Prime contractors are also required to ensure that ‘‘make or buy’’
decisions give ‘‘full and fair consideration’’ to qualified sources other than themselves for major
subsystems and components (WSARA 2009).
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (2009) also promotes competition by restricting
Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI). OCI refers to the scenario in which a contractor is in a
better position to compete for future government contracts due to its current relationship with the
government. For example, a contractor may be hired by the government to define the terms of
future competitions, while the same contractor is not excluded from the pool of potential
contenders (WSARA 2009, Section 207). While concern about inappropriate conflict of interest is
justifiable, overreaction to OCI can create significant unintended adverse consequences. A notable
critique comes from Goure (2010): ‘‘The pool of expertise in sophisticated system engineering and
technical analysis for complex, often highly classified defense areas is quite limited. There is only
one Skunk Works12 for example. But if a company such as Lockheed Martin is barred from working
on the next stealth fighter or SR-71 because it has helped in the initial research and development
effort, the nation will be the loser.’’
All the efforts above, although well intended, can promote inefficient industry structure.
Conventional economic wisdom that a competitive industry structure is better than a more
concentrated industry structure may be untrue in the case of the defense industry. Policy-makers
need to be reminded that the single-source contracting environment is a natural result of long-term
12 Skunk Works is an alias for Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Development Programs (ADP), formerly called
Lockheed Advanced Development Projects. Skunk Works is responsible for a number of well-known aircraft
designs, including the U-2, the SR-71 Blackbird, the F-117 Nighthawk, and the F-22 Raptor.
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competition among contractors and evolution of the free market economy. Therefore, a
concentrated industry structure can be an optimal response to the unique features of the defense
contracting environment. One such feature is that the lack of economies of scale opportunities
from the demand side makes industry consolidation the only option to achieve cost efficiency from
the supply side.
The evolution of the French defense industry structure in the past two decades potentially
offers insight into the industry structure issue. Starting in the late 1980s, the French government
gradually shifted away from cost-plus contracts to fixed-price contracts, in response to cost
overruns and defense budget reductions similar to what the U.S. is experiencing now. For
institutional reasons (Kapstein and Oudot 2009), French-style full-range migration to fixed-price
contracts is generally viewed to be a success. What is interesting is that during this process, the
French government actually encouraged, rather than discouraged, industry consolidation, which
resulted in usually only one firm, a ‘‘national champion,’’ at the prime-contract level in a specific
sector. Although more comprehensive analysis is needed to draw inferences, the French case is
consistent with our point that more concentrated structure in the defense industry is desirable.
To conclude, the present industry structure is an outcome of economic Darwinism and
perhaps is the best choice given the unique DoD contracting setting. Efforts to change the status
quo and the policy push to reverse the industry consolidation trend are potentially counterpro-
ductive.
DESIGNING OPTIMAL DEFENSE CONTRACTS
In this section, we offer two policy recommendations. The first, built upon previous sections, is
that the federal government should retain cost-plus contracts as the major contracting type for
designing defense contracts. Next, using a principal-agent framework, we recommend a particular
type of cost-plus contract that addresses the information asymmetry problem. In a nutshell, the
proposed contract induces truth-telling behavior from self-interest-motivated contractors (Reich-
elstein 1992). Hence, information asymmetry is reduced and greater cost efficiency is achieved.
Budget-Based Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee Scheme
As an alternative to a fixed-price contract, the cost-plus contract has various forms; the
standard cost-plus arrangements, CPFF, fully reimburse the actual reported costs and further add
a fixed fee as the contractor’s profit. This leaves little incentive for the firm to control costs because
the cost-saving behavior requires contractor effort and, in turn, generates disutility for them. To
alleviate this incentive problem, the Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contract is more commonly
used in practice. The standard CPIF contract takes the form as follows:
P ¼ cþ pðcÞ; ð1Þ
where:
pðcÞ ¼ aþ bðTC cÞ: ð2Þ
Note that P is the price paid by the government to the contract or, c is the actual reported cost
as agreed by the auditor, and pðcÞ is the contractor’s profit, which includes a target profit, a, and an
incentive term for cost overruns (or underruns) above (below) a pre-specified target cost, TC. The
parameter b (a positive coefficient between 0 and 1) is the cost share parameter. Since the
contractor is penalized (rewarded) when there exists a cost overrun (underrun), the contractor is
motivated to be more cost-efficient.
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The primary drawback of the standard CPIF contract is that the government frequently does
not possess the necessary information to form a basis for estimating target cost, TC, due to
significant information asymmetry. If TC is set too high, the contractor receives windfall bonuses at
the expense of taxpayers. On the other hand, if TC is set too low, such that the cost overrun is
unavoidable, the contractor is unfairly penalized.
Contractors (firms) usually have superior information concerning the expected cost of the
project, yet the government cannot rely on the firms’ estimates since contractors, as agents, may
not truthfully reveal their beliefs. A possible remedy to this dilemma is to introduce incentive
contracts that ensure that the contractors (who have an information advantage) voluntarily and
truthfully reveal their beliefs about the project’s estimated cost. The theoretical setting is the
principal-agent paradigm, in which the risk-neutral principal (i.e., the government) designs the
contract format such that profit-maximizing agents (i.e., the contractors) behave in the way that the
principal desires.
Under Budget-Based Cost-Plus Scheme (BBCPS), the task of estimating target cost shifts
from the government to the better-informed contractor; that is, the contractor is invited to submit a
‘‘budget cost,’’ which, in turn, is used to decide their profit via a specifically designed formula.
Consider a modification of Equation (2) due to Reichelstein (1992):
pðc;TCÞ ¼ aðTCÞ þ bðTCÞðTC cÞ; ð3Þ
where TC is the target cost submitted by the contractor. An important modification relative to
standard CPIF (Equation (2)) is that both a(target profit) and b(cost share parameter) are not
constants. Instead, they vary with TC to provide the correct incentives for the contractors to
truthfully reveal their unbiased cost estimate.
Reichelstein (1992) imposed the following restrictions to the functional forms of a(TC) and
b(TC), such that:
a0ðTCÞ, 0; a 00ðTCÞ. 0 and bðTCÞ ¼ a 0ðTCÞ: ð4Þ
The curvature of a(TC) specified by Restriction (4) is a downward-sloping convex function, as
shown in Figure 1.
From Equation (4), one can infer that b0¼a00,0. Hence, both a(target profit) and b(cost share
parameter) vary inversely with the budget cost, TC. This feature of the function provides a
disincentive for overstating the budget cost, which is a major concern for the less-informed
government. To demonstrate that the contracts characterized by Equations (1), (3), and (4) induce
contractors to voluntarily submit their unbiased cost estimates in maximizing profitability, assume
that the contractor has private information (which is unknown to the government) that the expected
project cost isl (i.e., l ¼ EðcÞ). If the contractor submitsl, the unbiased estimate, as the target cost
(i.e., telling the truth), the firm’s expected profit is aðlÞ according to Equation (3). Reichelstein
(1992) points out that deviating from truthful reporting yields lower expected profit thanaðlÞ.
Therefore, telling the truth is the optimal choice for a profit-maximizing contractor.
Refer to Figure 2: without losing any generality, suppose the contracting firm chooses to
submit E as the budget target cost, where E. l (over-reporting).
Applying geometry to the triangle DBCD implies the following is true for the line segment BC:
BC ¼ a 0ðEÞCD ¼ a 0ðEÞðE lÞ: ð5Þ
Moreover, the line segment:
AC ¼ aðlÞ  aðEÞ: ð6Þ
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Since BC,AC, substituting (5) and (6) into the inequality BC,AC yields:
a 0ðEÞðE lÞ, aðlÞ  aðEÞ: ð7Þ
The Inequality (7) can be transformed to:
aðEÞ  a 0ðEÞðE lÞ, aðlÞ: ð8Þ
Restriction (4) implies:
bðEÞ ¼ a 0ðEÞ: ð9Þ
Substituting Equation (9) into Equation (8) yields:
aðEÞ þ bðEÞðE lÞ, aðlÞ: ð10Þ
Note that by Equation (3), the left-hand side of Inequality (10) exactly represents the expected
profit of the contracting firm if the firm reports E as the estimate of their target cost. Furthermore,
Inequality (10) shows that this expected profit associated with over-reporting behavior is less than
aðlÞ, the expected profit by telling the truth. Thus, an over-reporting strategy is dominated by telling
the truth.
In a similar fashion, under Equations (1), (3), and (4), we can also show that any under-
reporting strategy is also dominated by truth-telling.13
In summary, a menu of contracts14 characterized by Equations (1), (3), and (4) induces
faithful disclosure of expected costs that is desirable under information asymmetry.15
FIGURE 1
The Target Profit Function aðTCÞ as Specified by Equation (4)
a 0ðTCÞ, 0: The first order derivative is negative, indicating that the curve is downward sloped.
a 00ðTCÞ. 0: The second order derivative is positive, indicating that the downward slope is flatter when TC gets bigger (i.e., convex).
13 Proof omitted; available upon request.
14 It is a menu of contracts because the profit formula, Equation (3), states that the contractor’s profit is
dependent upon the ‘‘budget target cost’’ submitted by the contractor. So the contractor is presented with a
menu of contracts rather than one contract, as in a CPIF scheme.
15 Kirby et al. (1991) point out that the budget-based scheme, with some variation, provides the same truth-telling
incentives to both risk-neutral and risk-averse agents.
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An Example of Budget-Based Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee Scheme
Consider an example to demonstrate how BBCPS can be implemented in practice. In
particular, we propose a two-stage execution. In the first stage, truth-telling behavior is induced by
an incomplete contract that satisfies Equations (1), (3), and (4). The contract is incomplete
because not all parameters are clearly specified. However, the satisfaction of Equations (1), (3),
and (4) is sufficient to generate truth-telling behavior. In the second stage, the principal (the
government) fully specifies the contract (i.e., to make it complete) by using the newly revealed





where the positive constant N is not specified until the second stage. It can be confirmed that the
above functional form of aðTCÞ satisfies Restriction (4). Moreover, Equations (4) and (11) imply:











Without loss of generality, assume that the contracting firm has the following private
information, which is unknown to the government: c, as a random variable, has three equally
probable outcomes: 50, 100, and 150. Therefore, the unbiased cost estimate is 100. The
contractor has three choices in terms of submitting the budget (target cost): either tell the truth (i.e.,
FIGURE 2
Over-Reporting (E) is an Inferior Strategy to Truth-Telling (l)
Please refer to the analyses and discussion in the subsection Budget-Based Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee Scheme.
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TC ¼ 100Þ, under-report (without loss of generality, assume TC ¼ 50), or over-report (without loss
of generality, assume TC ¼ 150).
The decision problem for the contracting firm facing this particular BBCPS reduces to Exhibit
1, where the firm’s profit under each combination of TC and c is calculated based on Equation (13).
Then, for each TC, the probability-weighted expected profit is computed. The firm chooses TC to
maximize its expected profit.
The last column of Exhibit 1 indicates that the contractor’s expected profit is maximized by
submitting TC ¼ 100, which is the firm’s unbiased cost estimate. Stated another way, the firm
voluntarily and truthfully reveals private information and, therefore, reduces information
asymmetry.
This completes stage one. The agent (the firm) voluntarily revealed the true belief about the
expected cost, and submitted TC ¼ 100.
Now the principal (the government) takes the contract into the second stage. The profit
utilizing Equation (13) is:





















To complete the analysis, suppose the government wants the contractor to have an expected profit
of 10 (i.e., 10 percent of its expected cost); the government can complete the contract and achieve
EXHIBIT 1
An Example of ‘‘Budget-Based Cost-Plus-Scheme’’ Inducing Contractor’s ‘‘Truth-Telling’’ Behavior
The menu of contracts presented to the contractor by the government can be described as follows:
P ¼ cþ pðcÞ,






where N is a constant that will be determined after the contractor submits TC, the budget target cost.
The three rows represent the contractor’s three possible strategies for reporting TC, i.e., under-reporting (TC ¼ 50), telling the truth
(TC ¼ 100), and over-reporting (TC ¼150).
The three columns represent the three equally possible outcomes of the actual cost incurred, i.e., c ¼ 50, c ¼ 100, and c ¼ 150.






The contractor chooses the reporting strategy that achieves the highest expected profit.
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that goal by choosing N¼ 1,000. So the final contract is:
P ¼ cþ p;
where:
p ¼ 10þ 0:1ð100 cÞ ¼ 20 0:1c:
Under this design, the total expected government payment is 110.
Note that if the government wants to use a fixed-price contract in the same setting, as we
argued before, it is likely that the risk-averse and better-informed contractor submits a bid much
higher than 100 to demand risk premium, as well as command information rents. As for the CPIF
alternative, the government lacks information to propose a realistic target profit, sharing
parameter, and, most importantly, target cost. Hence, the less well-informed government relies
on the better-informed contractor.
CONCLUSION
A trend in recent defense acquisition reform is the strong preference for fixed-price contracts
over cost-plus contracts. Our study cautions DoD policy-makers that the premise that fixed-price
contracts are better than cost-plus contracts in promoting cost efficiency is debatable, and
potentially counterproductive. Consequently, we recommend that cost-plus contracts remain as a
major contracting tool for MDAPs. Moreover, building on existing literature (e.g., Reichelstein
1992), we demonstrate that the contractors’ opportunistic cost misbehavior under traditional
cost-plus incentive contracts can be mitigated by using the budget-based cost-plus scheme. The
lack of use of this type of truth-inducing scheme in practice, in our view, suggests an opportunity
for improvement.
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